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Why Support  Services  Have  Failed
to Expand  Exports
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Policies impeding  and neglecting  the development  of commercial
services are a significant cause of the difficulties developing
countries experience trying to expand  exports. It is misguided to
entrust public sector trade organizations with primary respon-
sibility for providing exporters with support services that are
better provided by private commercial enterprises.
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This paper --  a product of the Trade Policy Division, Country Economics DXepartment  - is part of a larger effort in
PRE to study  export development  and supply response. Copies are available free  from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Sheila Fallon, room N1O-017,  extension 37947 (40 pages).
For more than 20 years, aid organizations have helped  The International Trade Center is not in a position to
developing countries supply export promotion,  reject a request for an unpromising use of UNDP
marketing, and other services to assist exports.  funds and is not allowed to recommend policies. And
Manufactured exports have been especially sought.  donor agencies are seldom successful at extending
though typically the policy environment for them  their impact beyond government.
remains no more than partly satisfactory. Public
sector trade promotion organizations, the main  *  Support for the marketing of manufactured
recipients of this aid, turn out to be rarely satisfactory  exports has usually been provided through  an inappro-
at providing practical information, assistance, and  priate delivery mechanism, a single public service
support for export expansion in such a setting.  supplier in which officials try to provide many
services, free of charge.  This has been ineffective in
Keesing and Singer identify four reasons why  countries with only partly satisfactory policies toward
external assistance to support services has been  manufactured exports. Donors have been committed
generally ineffective in expanding manufactured  to a sLrategy  of institution-building but permanent
exports:  trade promotion organizations set up early in develop-
ment tum out to be poorly suited to a developing
The legacy of import substitution in developing  country's later export needs. They even become a
countries includes deep-seated attitudes that work  vested interest against needed change. The complex-
against exporLs,  along with outdated production  itl of the task, lack of competition in services,
technology, low product quality, pwor  services to  deficiencies of public officials in a service role, and
customers, and business skills unsuited to exports.  rigid procedures contribute to their poor results. In
Regulation still impedes market responsiveness, while  some countries, systematic assistance to export
unfavorable policies have deprived local businesses of  marketinig  has been worse than ineifective because it
export know-how. Thus, the task is huge.  has diverted attention from the fundamental need for
policy reform.
Extemal assistance for suppon services has
rarely been directed toward helping export firms  Most developing countries assume that "export
overcomc their production probilms, improve their  promotion" is inherently a government task.  But what
supply capabilities, or adapt what they supply to the  developing countries need most is access to services
requirements of the target market. There has been  from outside the firm that can compensate for the
systematic ncglect of firms' need for expert advice in  limited expertise within  it. The required expertise is
these crucial areas.  rarely found in public sector organizations. New
approaches in this field center on the provision of
Donor agenicies  that provide funding and advice  consultants from more advanced countries  to work
in this field almost never insist on results or even  with exponers on their production and supply
require that progress be monitored in terms of exports  problems.
achieved.  Too many donor agencies with mnoney  to
give away chase too few good project opportunities.  See also the companion paper, WPS 544.
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work unde- way in the Bank's Policy, Research. and Extemal
AffairsComplex. An objective  of the serice is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fullypolished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in thcsc papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced hyv  the PRE Dissemination CenterHas outside development  assistance  to institutions  that provide
export promotior.,  marketing, and  services  support to exporters, actually
been effective in expanding exports?  We investigated  this question
This study  was carried out using  resources from the Trade Policy Division
of the  Country  Economics  Department  of  the  World  Bank.
The authors  would like to  express great appreciation to the many
organizations that cooperated  with  the research  by supplying interviewees
and other valuable sources of information:  the International  Trade Centre
of UNCTAD/GATT,  where a large  number of people were interviewed;  the units
most concerned  with  trade  promotion  in Directorates-General  I (External
Relations) and  VIII  (Development)  of  the  Commission  of  the European
Communities; the Export  Marketing Development Division of the Commonwealth
Secretariat; the Developing  Countries  Trade  Agency and British Overseas
Trade  Board  in  the  United  Kingdom;  the  United  States  Agency  for
International  Development; the Irish Export Board (Coras  Trachtala or CTT)
and the  Trade  Development  Institute  of  Irelaid;  the  Center  for the
Promotion of Imports from  Developing  Countries (CBI)  in the Netherlands;
the Federal Office for Trade Information (BFAI)  in the Federal Republic of
Germany: the Swedish Trade Council;  the Federal Economic Chamber (BWK) in
Austria; l'Office Suisse  d'Expansion  Commerciale  (OSEC)  in Switzerland;
the China External Trade Development Council (CETRA)  in Taiwan, China; the
Hong Kong Trade Development  Council; Singapore's  Trade Development Board;
overseas  offices  (particularly  in  Singapore)  of  the  Korean  Trade
Organization (KOTRA);  and the  Australi&n  Trade Commission (AUSTRADE)  and
New Zealand's  Trade Development  Board,  both  interviewed in their London
offices.  Thanks are also  extended  to  the  many World Bank staff  members
and consultants  who were interviewed  and contributed information fo. this
study.
We received  valuable comments  and  suggestions  on earlier drafts
have been received from  many people and we would like to thank all of you.
Our greatest debt is for  detailed  critical  comments from several of the
most senior  people in the field  of  trade promotion:  Michael Deeny, Paul
Hogan, Camilo Jaramillo, Gabriel  P.  Lee,  and Victor Santiapillai.  Each
disagrees  with us on  some  points.  Together  they persuaded us to make
significant revisions.-2-
as  part  of a study  on  how  to  improve  assistance  to support  services  for
manufactured  exports  in  the  many  developing  market  economies  where  the
value  of such exports has  become quite  substantial,  while  the  policy
environment  toward  them  is  still only partly  satisfactory. 1 The  support
services  focused  on  are  export  promotion,  marketing  assistance,  consultant
advice,  and  provision  of  export-related  information. A companion  paper
presents  our  findings  and  recommendations  on  how  to achieve  much  better
results  from  assistance  to these  services. 2
The  evidence  examined  indicates  that  to  date,  assistance  in  these
services  has  rarely been effective in  systematically  expanding  exports.
Considerable  amounts of  aid  resources  have  been  expended on  such
assistance  during  the  last  20  years, yet  very  little  direct  impact  on
exports  can  be demonstrated. 3 However,  new  approaches  just  beginning  to be
introduced  hold  out some  promise  of  better  results  in the  future.
In addition to  reviewing relevant documents we interviewed  a
large  number  of  people who  have  lonL  -tperience  in  this  field. They
1  Over  thirty  economies  clearly  fit  this description.  They  include  all
the  more  populous developing  market or mixed  economies  outside  Sub-
Saharan  Africa,  apart  from those such as  the  Republic  of  Korea  or
Portugal  which  have already  achieved  suitable  policies.
2  "Assisting  Manufactured  Exports Through Services:  New  Methods  and
Improved  Policies", to  appear shortly in  the  Policy,  Research  and
External  Affairs  Working  Paper  series  of  the  World  Bank.
3  Though  we  did  not  systematically  investigate  the  effectiveness  of
promotion  and  support  services  in  expanding  primary  exports,  almost  all
the  people  interviewed  were  quite negative  about  the  effectiveness  of
existing approaches in  promoting  exports  in  general, not  just
man-xfactured  exports. Their comments,  moreover,  almost  always  applied
'o  all  the  developing  countries they knew,  other  than  the  East  Asian
newly  industrializing  economies.-3-
included  senior  staff  of  almost  all  the  leading  organizations  that  provide
development  assistance  in  this area, as well  as officials  of  national
trade  promotion  organizations  in  developed market  economy  countries  and
newly  industrializing  economies.  We  did  not  visit  any  developing  country
trade  promotion  organizations  as  part  of  this  research,  but  between  us  we
have  visited  more than  a dozen  of them  for  other  purposes.
Our  principal  conclusions  on  the  situation  up to  now  are  based  on
an overwhelming  prepotiderance  of the  views and  evidence  available  to us.
The  virtual  consensus  does  not  extend,  however,  to  historical  explanations
of  how this  situation  has  con.e  about  nor  what to  do about  it.
Most developing  countries rely on  one  or  more  trade  promotion
organizations  (TPOs)  within  the  public sector for  export  promotion  and
marketing  services. However, in  developing  countries  with  no more  than
partly  satisfactory  policies toward manufactured  exports,  organizations
manned  by public officials have nearly always  proved  unsatisfactory  in
providing  practical information,  assistance,  and  support services  for
expanding  manufactured  exports. Unable  to be  as selective  or as expert  in
their  advice  as the  task requires, and  poorly  suited  for  providing  the
production-related  assistance  and  business services exporters  need  such
organizations  readily allow  themselves  to  be  deflected into  policy,
administrative,  or regulatory  tasks that conflict wit;.  the  provision  of
export  support  services.  Many  face almost  no private  competition.  This
is in sharp  contrast  to  the  situation in  the  developed  market  economies
and  the  successful  East Asian  exporters,  where many  competing  private
service  firms  and  associations  offer  relevant  services.-4-
Shortcomings  in  the  policy framework and  level  of development
have  contributed  to  the  poor  performance  of  developing  country  trade
promotion  organizations,  but in  addition, the  reliance  on public  TPOs  to
provide  trade  information  and  support services has,  in  our  judgment,
proved  a  misguided  means  of  expanding exports.  However,  the  failure  of
this  appreoch  and,  indeed,  of  most  outside  assistance  in  this  area,  does
not  mean  that trade  support  services are  unimport-ant  for  export
performance.  Rather,  East  Asian  experience  and  several  other  indications
suggest  that  in favorable  circumstances  the  impact  of support  services  on
exports  can  be  substantial  (See Keesing 1988 for  a iiscussion  of the
leading  East  Asian  trade  promotion  organizations).
Why Support  Services  in  Developing  Cour.tries  are  Ineffective
Our  findings  suggest  that a  combination  of four  primary  reasons
explains  t.he  general ineffectiveness  of  external assistance  to support
services  for  manufactured  exports:
1.  The  legacy of  import  substitution  in  developing countries has
increased  the  complexity of  the  effort required, particularly  in
changing deep-rooted  attitudes and motivations that work against
exports.
2.  External  assistance for  support services has  rarely  been  directed
toward  helping exporting firms overcome their  production  problems,
improve  their  supply  capabilities,  or  adapt what they  supply  to the
requirements  of  the  target market.  Yet  these  suppl*v  aspects  of-5-
exporting  are  cen.  al  to  export success and  tend  to be the  most
difficult  tasks  for  developing  country  exporters.
3.  The  donor  agencies  that  provide  funding and  advice  in this  field  hav-
not  been  sufficiently  concerned with  the  impact of their  funds  in
expanding exports and  have  generally  lacked the  power  or  the
determination  needed to  insist that a  strong positive impact  be
achieved.
4.  Support  and  assistance  for  the  marketing  of  manufactured  exports  have
usually  been  provided though an  inappropriate  delivery  mechanism  in
the  form of  a  single public service supplier, involved  in  other
activities,  that  delivers  nearly all  services free  of charge. This
delivery  mechanism  has  not  proved effective  in  developing  countries
with  policies  not  yet-strongly  supportive  of  manufactured  exports.
These  four  influences  and  the  difficulties  they  create  are  the
focus  of  most  of this  paper.  Recent  changes  and  promising  experiments  in
donor  programs  are  described  toward  the  ena  of the  paper. Our  companion
paper  focuses  on  how  to improve  the  situation.
The  Legacy  from  Import  Substitution
TJntil  recently import substitution  policies have  prevailed  in
almost all  developing countries.  These policies have  led  to  the
imposition  of tight  restrictions  on  imports and  to  many  other  controls.
As a result,  overall  growth performance  has  deteriorated  amidst  shortages
of foreign  excbange  and  other  resources.  Another  usual  outcome  has  been  a
lack  of competition in domestic industries  and  the  emergence  of soft
sellers'  markets  riddled with  shortages.  Deficiencies  have  become  or
remained  severe  in areas  important for  export  success,  such  as  packaging
skills,  modern  production  technologies,  and  support  services  for  exports.-6
The  legacy of  t,.ese  policies has  also been  detrimental  to
manufactured  exports  in  other  important  areas  as discussed  below.
The  wrong  skills, the wrong  attitudes.  Business  success  under  an
import  substitution  regime  depends  primarily  on the  ability  to obtain  from
government  regulators  whatever  is most  needed  to  make  profits:  exclusive
ac^ess  to scarce  imports,  duty exemptions on imported  inputs,  high rates
of  protection,  and  so  on.  Thus business people  have  become  skilled  at
"rent-seeking."  Public officials.  have  responded by further  regulating
supply  and  setting up  ubiquitous  controls.  Meanwhile  business  skills
relating  to innovation,  responsiveness  to  buyer  preferences,  marketing,
quality control, tight cost control, and  production efficiency  have
generally  been  neglected.  Business people have  become  insensitive  to
buyers'  preferences, so  that  teaching them how  to  export calls  for
reversing  their  basic  business  attitudes. 4 These  wrong  attitudes  become  an
enormous  obstacle  to export  success  when  policies  begin  to  move  toward  an
outward  orientation.
The  wrong  production  base.  Import  substitution  policies  encourage  the
production  of copycat  products,  usually at well below  an efficient  scale
in  plants  using  outdated  or inferior  technologies.  In  a soft,  easy  market
with  mounting  scarcities,  product  quality  often  deteriorates.  By the  time
policies  begin  to  change in  an  export-oriented  direction,  prices  are
4  According  to CBI,  the  Netherlands  organization  promoting  imports  from
developing  countries,  the  most  common complaints  from  Dutch  importers
doing  business  with developing  countries are (a)  delays  in replying  or
inability  to contact suppliers; (b)  inconsistent  quality,  especially
"finish";  and (c)  late, irregular,  or  incomplete deliveries.  Such
complaints,  echoed by  importers elsewhere, are  the  legacy  of soft
domestic  sellers'  markets.-7-
generally  high,  the  quality  of products  is low,  and  the  quality  of service
to customers  is  poor  or  nonexistent.
Responsiveness  slowed by  regulation.  Import  substitution  policies
typically  leave  developing  countries with  rigid  bureaucratic  controls  on
many  of the  aspects  of  business activity that  are  critical  to success  in
exporting.  When far-sighted  entrepreneurs  do  try  to  export,  controls  on
investment,  restrictions  on  imports, exchange  controls,  other  regulatory
controls,  and  credit rationing impede adjustment of  their  production
facilities.  Controls  obstruct  their efforts to  obtain  needed  inputs  and
services  and  to sell  their  products  and  production  capabilities.
Lack  of export know-how.  Unfavorable policies  have  deprived  local
businesses  of  know-how  in  manufacturing  for  export. Manufactured  products
for  export to  developed countries are  generally quite  different  from
anything  produced  for  local markets.  Exports nearly  always  have to  be
shipped  as complete  packages,  ready  for  the  end  user. Thus  they  must  meet
all  buyer  specifications  concerning packaging  requirements  (for  example,
labels,  printed  instructions,  exterior printing,  and  packing  materials),
as  well  as those related to  raw materials,  color,  finish,  styling,  and
technical  features. For  many  products,  designs  and specifications  change
rapidly.  Developing country exporters thus have  to  organize many
unfamiliar  tasks  and  meet  many  demanding criteria a  once.  Examples  of
the  criteria  they  must  meet are  presented in  table  ~,  which  is  based  on
answers  to  a questionnaire  sent to  a  cross-section  of  U.S.  importers
buying exports from developing  countries.  Experience in  a  highly
protected  developing  country  market  does not  prepare  firms  to  meet these
criteria.- 8  -
Table  1  page  7-9-
Moreover,  lack  of  experience is  in  itself  a serious  handicr.p.
Most  buyers prefer to  place  orders with  suppliers  'who already  have
considerable  export  experience  and  know-how and who  can  be expected  to
perform everything that  is  required reliabiy (see Keesing and  Lall
forthcoming;  Keesing  1983).
Neglect  of Supply  Aspects  of Exporting
Nearly  all  external assistance tG  developing country  support
services  for  export expansion has  shared a  central deficiency.  This
deficiency  is a systematic  neglect of  'irms' need  for  expert  advice  on
production  for  export. and  the  closely related tasks  of upgrading  the
firm's supply capabilities  and  adjusting  what  is  supplied to  the
requirements  of the  target  market  or  markets. Advice  on  production,  other
supply tasks,  and  associated  management  tasks  has  rarely been
systematically  provided  by official trade  promotion  organizations,  either
directly  or through  consultants. 5 Recent innovations  in  donor  assistance
in this  field  consist mainly of ways  to supply  these  missing  services,
which  have turned  out  to  be  what  entrepreneurs  most  want (and  need)  to
expand exports from their enterprises.  Nearly always the  service
suppliers  have to  be brought  in from  rrw-e  advanced  economies.
5  A few  TPOs ha e  taken  a  more  inclusive  view  of  their  marketing
responsibilitie  and have  become involved in  design  and  packaging.
However,  effective  programs  in  design and  related  areas  appear  almost
entirely  limited  to  TPOs  in fairly  advanced,  industrializing  economies,
such  as Ireland,  Singapore,  and  Taiwan,  China.
I  I  K-P~~~~~~~"I- ic  -
In exceptional  economies  with  fully  satisfactory  policies  toward
manufactured  exports,  particularly  the  Republic of  Korea,  Singapore,  and
Taiwan,  China,  public  service  institutions  that have  been  set  up to  help
industry  in such  areas  as  productivity,  technology,  standards,  and  overall
development  have  actively contributed  to  eirport  expansion by  helping
exporters  with their  supply  tasks. This  is rarely  the  case  with analogous
institutions  in  countries with  less than  fully satisfactory  policies
toward  manufactured  exports. 6
The  importance  of  upgrading supply is  obvious.  In a  market
economy,  a  manufacturing  business  must maintain  a  very  close  relationship
between  marketing  and  production.  Su ply  must  be odjusted  to  what  .the
market  is looking  for,  while  sales  must  be based  on  what the  business  can
rsliably  supply. The  firm  must  update  and  improve  its  production  methods
to  keep  up  with the  competition.
For  developing country firms looking for  export orders  from
buyers  (importers)  from  major  developed country markets,  what counts  in
6  This  can  be inferred  from  research  findings  by Carl  Dahlman  and  others,
both  inside  and  outside  the  World Bank,  on technology  development  and
institutions concerned  with  technology  diffusion  in  various
industrializing  countries. Institutional  arrangements  involved  in this
assistance  varied  enormously  among  the  three  economies  named. However,
each of  the  three has  evidently been  able to  find and  enlist
consultants  who  havp  the  requisite  know-how. In  economies  with Chinese
populations,  many  of these  experts were  drawn  from  industries  ef pre-
1949  Shanghai,  Hong  Kong,  and  the  developed  countries.- 11  -
marketing is  the  buyer's perception  of  the  exporting firm's  supply
capabilities  mnd  its  readiness  to  fulfill all  aspects  of the  order.  The
buyer  will  also  be concerned with  the  firm's  reliability  as a supplier,
taking  into  account  its  location and  the  country's  policies. While  the
specifications  of  what is to  be produced  are  likely  to  vary from  one  order
to  ancther, each order  is  inflexible in  its  requirements  regarding
quality,  price,  and  on-time  delivery. Inability  to  meet any  aspect  of the
ver-  detailed  specifications  disqualifies  a  manufacturer  (or  industry  or
country)  as a source of  supply (sze for  example, Egan  and  Mody 1990;
Keesing  1983).
Supply  Derformance  is  always crucial in exporting  manufactured
products  to  developed  country  markets.  Each  firm  in its  specialties  must
reach  high standards  close  to internat'onal  best  practice  for  its  range  of
products  and  its  segment  of  the  market.  In this  situation,  advice  from
first-rate  consultants  can  make  an  enormous difference  and is  often  what
is  most needed to  expand exports.  This advice complements  policy
improvements  that  make exports  feasible  and  potentially  profitable.
Exporters must  also  learn how  to  convince buyers of their
strengths  and  supply capabilitias,  and  they must  develop  a  marketing
strategy  and  learn  which  orders to  seek and  accept.  But  as a rule,
challenges  such  as these  are  not  as difficult  as  acquiring  the  requisite
supply  capabilities.- 12 -
In  developing countries,  neglect of  the  supply aspects of
exporting  arises  partly  because  they set  up trade  promotion  organizations
in  imitation  of those  that already existed  elsewhere. Disregard  for  the
production-related  aspects of  exports  has  been  pervasive in  trade
promotion  efforts in  developed countries throughout the  20th  century.
The  implicit  strategy  has  been  to  leave supply to the  private  sector.
Neglect  also  stems  from  the way  governments  are  organized. Most  draw  a
sharp  division between export marketing, which  they view  as part  of
international  trade,  and  export  production,  which  they  see  as an activity
within  industry. Helping  businesses sell exports  is  viewed  as a concern
of trade  officials,  but  industrial  production  is  not.
By  the time  the  International  Trade  Centre  (ITC)  was created  in
Geneva  in  1964,  with trade promotion in  developing  countries  as its  area
of  concern,  this  approach  was firmly  entrenched. 7 8
Donor  Lack  of Leverage  and  Acceptance  of  Low Impact
Donors and  international organizations  that provide export
marketing assistance to  developing  countries almost never  insist  on
results,  or  even  require  that progress be  monitored  in terms  of exports
7  ITC,  headquartered  in  Geneva, has  since 1968  been  a  joint  subsidiary
organ  of the  General Agreement of  Tariffs and  Trade  (GATT)  and  the
United  Nations  acting  through the United Nations  Conference  on  Trade
and  Development  (UNCTAD).
8  Most of the  industrialized  countries  set  tip  public  sector  organizations
or gavernment  units  to promote  exports between  the  1920s  and  the  early
1950s. TPOs  then spread to  intermediate  economies  such  as Ireland
(1952)  and  Israel  (1958) and  also began to  spread to  developing
countries.- 13 -
achieved. Rarely  do they  insist that  their  assistance  be concentrated  in
areas  where  it  will  have  a  significant  impact on overcoming  the  major
constraints  to export  expansion,  nor  do they  make assistance  conditional
on improvements  in  policies  or  policy implementation.  Rather,  they  tend
to offer grant assistance for purposes not  dependably  connected  with
export  results:  for  establishing  permanent  export  promotion  institutions,
funding  some  of  their activities and  programs, training  their  staff,
strengthening  their  information  systems, or  supporting  of the  country's
participation  in  trade  fairs.  Too  often the  donors  and  agencies  treat
such  actions  as ends  in  themselves,  independent  of the  exports  that  may or
may  not  resuit  from  them.
This mode  of  operation  is  partly  a  consequence  of  the
International  Trade  Centre's influence.  Assistance  to  export  promotion
and  related services in  developing  countries is  the  ITC's  principal
mandate.  However, ITC  and  certain other  leading organizations  that
provide  such  assistance  have  only  limited powers  and  instruments,  which
give  them  little leverage over developing countries'  export  policies.
These  international  TPOs are  not  supposed to  recommend policies  to
developing  countries,  nor  are  they  free  to  choose  the  countries  and  policy
environments  in  which  they  provide assistance.  Rather,  they  are supposed
to respond  to requests from developing  countries.  Thus  the  recipients
soon  learn that they can  determine which  of  their  institutions  will
receive  assistance,  for  what  purposes,  and  in  what  policy  environment.
Lack  of leverage  in influencing  its  own  programs  is  in  our  view
particularly  serious  in  ITC.  It  has  also  been  a problem  in  Directorate
General  VIII  - Development  (DG8) of  the  European  Commission  in  Brussels,- 14  -
which  administers  aid  to  African, Caribbean,  and  Pacific  countries  under
the  Lomd  Conventions,  and  in  the  Commonwealth  Secretariat,  which
administers  the  Commonwealth  Fund  for  Technical  Cooperation.
Meanwhile  other donors and  executing agencies, including  the
World  Bank  and  bilateral  assistance agencies, that  do have  some  latitude
to require major  reforms or  export results as  a  cond'tion  of their
assistance  in  this area, at  times  lack the  determination  to  do so.
Moreover,  at times  their staff and  consultants  have simply  applied  the
traditional  approaches that  the  major  providers of  international
assistance  in  this  field have  shaped.  The  World  Bank  has  pushed  for
policy  reforms  in  many  of  its  recent  loans  that  have  included  assistance
to services,  but  in the project components relating  to services,  it  has
resorted  fairly  often  to traditional  public  service  approaches.
One  reason  donors  lack  determination  and  do not  demand  reforms  is
that  several  donors are  trying to  give  away money  in  this  area,  so
recipient  countries  often  play  them off  against each  other  to get  what
they  want.  Too  many  donor  agencies with  too  much  money  to  give  away  are
chasing  too  few  good  project  opportunities.  The  result  is  a sort  of grant
recipients'  market  that  some refer to  as  'aid pollution."  One  person
interviewed  cited  the  case  of a  developing  country  that  was being  offered
advice  and  aid  relating  to  export  expansion  from  14 separate  agencies.
Nearly two-thirds  of  ITC  funds  for  assistance projects in
developing  countries  come  from  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)
allocations,  which  are  made  in  advance based  on a formula  that  reflects
population  and  poverty. For  the  recipient  country  these  grant  allocations
serve,  in effect,  as an  entitlement,  allowing  it to  obtain  assistance  from- 15  -
its  choice  of operating  agencies  in  the  U.N.  system  (ITC.  U.N.  Industrial
Development  Organization,  U.N.  Educational  Scientific and  Cultural
Organization,  World  Health  Organization,  and  others).
If a country  chooses  to  use  its  UNDP  funds  for  trade  promotion,
ITC  normally  serves  as the  implementing  agency.  As a result,  ITC  is  not
in  a good  position  to  reject a  request for  an  unpromising  use  of UNDP
funds. If the  recipient country wishes  to  spend  some or all  of its
allocation  on totally  ineffective  activities, for  instance,  futile  trade
missions to  impossible  markets or  useless tours for  senior trade
officials,  ITC  can  try  to  persuade the  country  to do something  else,  but
is  virtually  obliged  to support the  requested  activities  if the  recipient
government  insists. Similarly, funds administered  for  trade  development
by DG8  of the  European  Community are  allocated  in  advance  and treated  as
entitlements,  usable  in  this  area  or in others.
One result  of  this institutional  arrangement  is that  external
assistance  agencies have  built up  a  tolerance to  projects that  are
attractive  to  the  recipient government  and  its  public servants,  but
ineffective  as  a means  of  achieving  export  expansion.
Donor  agencies  often  continue to  fund  technical  assistance  year
after  year  in  countries where  the  policy environment  remains  strongly
biased  against exports.  They sometimes claim  that a  sustained  aid
relationship  allows external advisers to  make  a  systematic  effort  to
persuade  the  country  to  change its policies, but  this  has  been  a feeble
way to  try  to influence  policies.
Another  serious  consequence  of  this arrangement is  that  donor
agencies  have seldom succeeded in  extending their  influence  and  impact- 16 -
beyond  government,  and  into  the  business community. This  is especially
the  case  where  business  people generally  mistrust  the  government  and  view
its  controls  and  interventions  negatively.
A further  consequence  is  that donor agencies are  forced  to go
along  with  projects  with  mixed  objectives.  In  much  of  Africa  and  parts  of
Southeast  Asia,  indigenization  of  business  (replacing  ethnic  minorities)
can  be  as  important a  goal  to  the  recipient government as export
expansion.  Governments  also  expect to  blend  other  objectives  in  with
export expansion, such as  rural employment in  cottage industries,
dispersion  of industry away  from  the  capital, and  issues  of regional
equity. The  usual  effect  of such  mixed  objectives  is to  weaken  the  impact
on exports  still  further,  or even  to  make it  negative.
An Ineffective  Service-Delivery  Mechanism
A further  important  influence on export  promotion  activities  has
been the  strong commitment of  important donors to  a  strategy of
institution  building.  The  basic concept is  that  technical  assistance
should  not  confine  itself  to  a  short-term  injection  of foreign  advice  and
expertise,  but  some of  this expertise should be  left behind  in the
recipient  country  so that  the  effect  is sustained  rather  than  transitory.
The  UNDP's  commitment  to institution  building  is  particularly  strong,  but
it is  shared  in  varying  degrees  by ITC  and  some  other  donor  agencies.
In  our  view,  the  institutions  created early  on are  not  what a
country  needs  later,  and  donors  can  create  better  institutional  results  as
a side  benefit  of  pursuing exports as  the  primary  objective.  Moreover,
the  institution  building principle detracts from the  primacy of the- 17 -
objective  of helping  the  developing country  achieve  export  expansion  and
structural  adjustment.9
A particularly  serious  problem  has  been  the  widespread  assumption
by  donors and  recipients alike that  institution  building means,  in
practice,  the  building  of permanent  institutions  within  the  public  sector. 10
Thus,  for  example,  ITC's promotional  literature  describes  its  second  most
important activity, after  establishing a  national trade promotion
strategy, as  westablishing appropriate  government institutions  and
services."  This  activity  has  led  to the  widespread  creation  of  official
trade promotion organizations  that are  ineffective  and  unsuited to
developing  countries'  future  needs.
In  most  cases  these permanent organizations  were set  up during
early  stages  in  the  country's development,  when  the  legacy  from  import
9  One  way  agencies  have implemented  institution  building  is to  designate
a local  "counterpart,"  nominated by  the  recipient government,  for
nearly  every  external adviser.  This approach has  biased  technical
assistance  toward public service institutions,  regardless  of their
suitability  for  specific  tasks.  Since overseas  travel  is typically  a
government-rationed  luxury,  the  job  of  counterpart  tends  to  be highly
valued,  thus  the  selection  process tends  to be influenced  by political
and  other  extraneous  concerns.  Counterparts  chosen  in this  way often
have  no  intention of  using directly the  experience  gained. Much
promotion  activity  is therefore burdened  with  unsuitable  courterparts,
lacking  any  real  commitment  to  the  task. This  diverts  the  attention  of
the  foreign consultant and  increases the  cynicism of the  business
participants.
10  When  suggestions  are made  about  relying heavily on  private  sector
services,  senior staff in  international  organizations  such  as ITC
often  respond  with  doubts.  Issues raised include  whether  private
chambers  and  associations  can  obtain money  on  the  scale  needed  for
export  promotion,  since they tend  to  be weak financially;  whether
local  export  firms  can  be persuaded  to  seek  paid  private  services;  and
whether  local consultants  know  enough about exports to  be  worth
hiring. These  are  important problems that do influence  what  can  be
done.  (ITC does assist private chambers of commerce  in  providing
their  members  with  export-related  information  and  training  in  how  to
export  in  countries  where  the  government  asks  for  such  as3istance.)- 18 _
substitution  was  still predominant.  Faced with  the  huge  task  of
transforming  this  legacy to  an  outward  orientation  emphasizing  exports,
most  developing  country  governments  did  not  carry  out  anything  like  the
required  reforms,  especially  when reforms would  operate  against  the  self-
interest  of  powerful  political  constituencies. Even  in subsequent  years,
reforms  have  tended to *be only partial and  selective,  and  not  nearly
sufficient  to create  an economic  environment  truly  favorable  for  exports.
Difficulties  in  exporting usually remained formidable in the
early  years  of policy  adjustment.  Access to imported  inputs  was highly
unsatisfactory,  while  many  domestically  produced  inputs  were prohibitively
expensive or  of  unacceptable  quality.  Exporters had  to  expend
considerable  effort  obtaining permissions,  circumventing  restrictions  and
controls,  and  contending  with  shortages,  slow and  unreliable  delivery,
poor  service,  deficient  quality  of raw  materials,  unsuitable  attitudes  and
training  of employees, and  other assorted problems  characteristic  of a
heavily controlled, disequilibrium  economy.  Access to  services  and
consultants  from  abroad  was  generally blocked as  well.  Thus  for  most
entrepreneurs,  exports  were still  unattractive. Yet  it  was at this  stage
or  even  earlier, before  any  substantial  transformation  of  import
substitution  policies  had  occurred, that most  developing  countries  began
to receive  external  assistance for  services  to support  export  expansion,
and  were encouraged  to set  up  TPOs  as  permanent  institutions  to  promote
exports.
In  a market  economy,  sustained  export  expansion  requires  a  policy
environment  that  has  at  least begun  to make  a  substantial  number  of
exporting  activities relatively  profitable and  attractive,  compared  to
other  business opportunities.  Another important influence on  export- 19  -
expansion  during  a  policy transition  is  the  credibility  of the  policy
changes,  that  is, whether the  government gives clear  and  consistent
signals  of its  long-term  commitment  to  manufactured  export  development  and
an outward  orientation. Only when  the  business  community  realizes  that
its  longer-term  profitability  depends  on successful  adjustment  to  this  new
reality  will it start  to take  seriously  the  difficult  task  of  changing  its
ways.  Pushing  the  policy  transition  at  least  to that  point  appears  to be
the  fundamental  precondition  for  assistance to  exporters  through  support
services  to  have  any  possibility  of  being  effective. This  situation  was
not  widely  understood  in countries  that  very  early  set  up permanent  public
sector  institutions  in  support of  exports --  usually  trade  promotion
organizations  --  in  hopes  of increasing  their  nontraditional  exports.
Experts  on export  promotion  are  divided  in their  opinions  on the
extent  to  which  the  creation of  official TPOs  in  the  early  stages  of
transition  from  import  substitution  was  justified  at the  time,  typically
in the  1960s  or  1970s, and  to what  extent (if  any)  some  of the  new
organizations  proved  useful  in  their  early years. On balance  the  results
appear  to  have  been  at  best  slight  and  mixed.
In some  countries  systematic  assistance to  export  marketing  has
been  worse  than  ineffective,  since it  has  diverted  attention  from  the
fundamental  need for policy reform, tempting the  goverrnment.  to  believe
that  promotion  could  work  the  magic  of structural  adjustment  without  the
need for  difficult  policy  changes  and  much sustained  hard  work.
Further  unfortunate  consequences  of  starting so soon  have  been
that  most TPOs  learned  the wrong  skills;  concentrated  on selling  products- 20
already  being produced, particularly products based on  local  natural
resources;  and  became dincouraged  and  perfunctory in their  marketing-
related  tasks. They were  diverted to  other  activities,  lost  promising
staff,  suffered  cuts  and  uncertainties  in  funding, learned  to fake  the
effectiveness  of  what they  were doing,  and  never  gained  the  support  of the
business  community.  At the  same  time, they  learned  to fight  for  their
survival  and  their  bureaucratic  turf.
As policy  environments  have  improved  and  governments  have  become
committed  to  somewhat more  outward-looking  policies,  the  organizations
created  early  have  proved  unsuitable for  the  needs  that  have  emerged  and
have  become an  obstacle to  the  creation of  new  and  better  support
services. In practice,  existing  TPOs are  almost  impervious  to efforts  to
reform  them  into effective institutions.  For  example, we know of  no
instance  in  which  World  Bank  assistance for  this purpose  has  had the
desired  lasting  effect,  although  in  recent years  attempts  have  been  made
in  at least  a  dL en countries.
What  developing  countries need most  to  support  exports  at the
firm  level  is for  firms  to  have  access  to services  that  can  compensate  for
their  owvn  limited  expertise. This  is  true  not  only  for  selling  exports,
but  also  for  adapting  production  so  that  firms  supply  what foreign  buyers
want.  However,  nearly  all  developing countries  have  opted  for  a service
delivery  mechanism  that  is  fundamentally  inappropriate  for  achieving  these
requirements.
Most  developing  countries  seem  to believe  that  export  promotion  -
not  only  the  task  of  persuading  firms  to  export,  but  also  the  provision  of
services to  support export marketing  - is  inherently a  task for
government.  The  predominant  pattern has  been  to set  up a public  sector- 21 -
TPO  as the  sole  or  main  supplier of  most  or all  services  in  support  of
export  marketing,  and  to  offer  these  services  free  of  charge. 11
Some  Characteristics  of Public  Service  Trade  Promotion  Organizations
Public  sector  TPOs  are  now  the  rule  in  developing  countries. In
building  their  TPOs  on this  public sector  model,  many countries  appear  to
have  been  strongly  influenced  by  donor  agencies  and  their  consultants,  as
well  as by existing  TPOs  in  industrial countries. Beyond  this,  both the
donor  agencies  and  the  newly  independent  recipient countries  have  had
strong  statist  predilections.
Almost  all  the  developing  countries' present  TPOs  obtain  their
funding  from  the  government,  supplemented  here  or there  by foreign  aid  or
by charges for  regulatory  documents.  Three are  funded directly  by
taxpayers  through  levies  on imports  (Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  and  Sri  Lanka).
Zimbabwe  is  now  introducing  a  surcharge on  exports and  imports  for  a
similar  purpose. Only  three  receive  membership  fees  or  contributions  from
the  private  sector_or  from  chambers  and  associations  (India,  Thailand,  and
Turkey).  (ITC  1988).
11 A few  countries,  such  as  Brazil, India,  and  the  Philippines,  have set
up  more  than one  major  public sector supplier of these  services.
Those  developing  countries  most inclined  to  rely  on private  businesses
and  the  operation of  free  markets have  generally allowed the
simultaneous  development  of private services relating  to exports  and
have  encouraged  the  emergence of  private associations  and  chambers
offering  some  services  of their  own.- 22  -
Problems  with the  Basic  Concept  of TPOs
Our  search for  successful examples of  export promotion  and
marketing  organizations  and  our interview findings  on  what  has gone  wrong
show  that  negative  experiences  have been very  much  the  rule. Despite
this,  most  experts interviewed  believe that developing country  trade
promotion  organizations  can  be,  and  sometimes are,  effective  both in
providing marketing assistance and  in  pressing for  needed policy
improvements,  particularly  when  (or  if)  they can  achieve  four  crucial
conditions,  namely,  they  enjoy  the  support  of the  business  community,  are
adequately funded, are  staffed with  qualified people who  are  paid
commercially  competitive  salaries, and  are  somewhat independent of
government.  Advocates  of TPOs  are  almost  always  striving  to  achieve  these
conditions.
However,  TPOs  meeting  these conditions  are  virtually  nonexistent
in  practice  except in  countries with  excellent policies and  a strong
policy  commitment to  expand manufactured  exports.  Sustained  business
support  depends  on effectiveness  and  results,  which  are  hard to  achieve
where  policies  are  only  partly satisfactory.  Adequate  funding,  creation
of a  qualified staff compensated  by  suitable,  commercially  competitive
salaries  and  independence  from  government  all  depend  on  discerning  support
from  the  government  and  some  support from  the  business  community  as  well.
These  conditions are  also almost impossible  to  achieve in  a  policy
environment  in which  the  needs of  exports do  not receive  dependable
attention  and  support. Along  with the  debilitating  effects  of  not  meeting
these  conditions,  TPOs  are  weakened by  confusion  and  out-of-date  notions
about  their  role.- 23 -
The  function  of  support service supply to  exporters  has  been
confused  with another  function important in  developing  exports,  that  of
ensuring  a continuing  dialogue between policy  formulators  and  those  most
affected  by  policy changess  the  business community.  In successful
exporting nations, feedback  is  channeled through a  well-developed
structure  of representative  associations  or chambers  that  continuously  and
aggressively  promote  the  business community viewpoint  to the  government.
Many developing  countries,  however,  have  used  this  need for  feedback  from
business  as an argument  for  a  specialized  public  sector  agency  .o  promote
both  the  cause  of exports  and  the  needs  of exporters.
Our  research  suggests  that a  public  service  organization  is  not
well suited  to serve  as  a  mechanism  for  providing  feedbLck  from  exporters
on policy  formulation.  Unlike  business  people,  public  servants  are  rarely
willing  to speak  out  against  bad  policies  or to  criticize  policymakers  in
the  ministry  they  are  affiliated  with.  Moreover,  in  the  early  stages  of a
policy  transition,  when feedback is vital, issues related  to  advice  on
policy  tend  to  dominate the  TPO's concerns, to  the  detriment  of its
ability  to supply  useful services.  A  further consequence  of taking  a
position  mid-way  between  government  and  exporters  is  that  either  party  to
the  dialogue  is  unlikely  to  trust  the  TPO.
Another  line  of reasoning  that  has  contributed  to the  persistance
of  public service TPO's  in developed and  developing  countries  alike,
starts  by  noting that  the  core services provided by  most  TPO's  are
"Information  services." It  then  contends that  the  public  sector  ought  to
provide  information  services  free  of  charge  on a single-supplier  basis,  as
if information  for  exporters  were  merely an  extension of the  public
library's  function.24 -
However,  the  free,  centralized  provision  of information  services
has  not served the  interests of  export expansion.  This  approach  has
starved  these  services  of  money, hindered  private  service  providers  from
entering  the  market, and  retarded the  exploitation  of  new information
technologies  by  discouraging  commercial  information  services.  New
information  technologies,  such  as  on-line data bases,  mean that  much  of
the  information  required  for  exporting can  now  be obtained  on a  pay-as-
you-go  basis,  without  the  need  for  large,  fixed  investments  in  hard  copy
library  materials. Setting up  special libraries is  thus  no longer  the
most  cost-effective  route  for  providing  information  for  exporters.
Another  argument  for  the  state's continuing  role  in information
services is  that  its  diplomatic posts provide privileged access  to
commercially  useful  information  from foreign governments.  However,  this
does  not  justify  having  a  public sector TPO  operating  as  a sole  supplier
of this  information.  Even  this privileged information  can readily  be
disseminated  through  commercial  suppliers  that  may  charge  for  its  use.
Relative  Effectiveness  of Official  TPOs
The  findings  for  the  developing  countries  with  policies  less  than
fully  favorable for manufactured  exports contrast with  what  we have
learned  about  the  TPOs  and  their support  services  in  the  successful  newly
industrializing  East  Asian  economies.  TPOs  in  these  are  effective  and
undoubtedly  cost-effective.- 25 -
Three  of these organizations  were  started more  than  a decade
after  their  economies  achieved  fully  satisfactory  policies  toward  exports,
while  the  fourth  (in Korea) seems to  have been ineffective  until  many
years  after  the  country  attained  fully  satisfactory  policies. Thus,  these
organizations  do  not really provide a  model  for  developing  countries  in
policy  transition  to follow.  Indeed,  successful  organizations  were only
achieved  after  a long  build-up  of experience  by private  service  suppliers,
private  associations,  and  small units of government  officials  concerned
with trade  (Keesing  1988).
We have  also  investigated  the  effectiveness  of trade  promotion
organizations  in developed market economies (Seringhaus  and  Rosson  1980
chapter  2; Singer  1990).  Almost all  OECD countries  have  policies  that
are  favorable  to  manufactured  exports and  trade  promotion  organizations,
most  of  which  are  official.  Typically, their central  function  is to
provide  trade-related  information. In  general, their  impact  on exports
seems  to  be only  modest.
Both  the  successful  East Asian  economies  and  the  OECD  countries
encourage  private  soirces  of  information  and  specialized  assistance  that
offer  services  that overlap with  those the  TPOs provide. Membership
associations  and  chambers of  commerce provide advice, training,  and
information  to exporters,  as  do  a  wide  variety of private  service  and
financial  firms.
By  contrast, in  more  than 40  interviews  with  advisers to
developing  countries  in  this field who  we  asked  to  cite  examples  of
particularly  effective national  systems  of  export development  in
developing  countries,  other  than  the  four successful  exceptions  of East
Asia,  only  three  TPOs  were typically  with  only  faint  praise,  by more  than- 26 -
two  respondents:  those  of Thailand  and  Sri  Lanka  and  one  of those  in the
Philippines.12
As for  other developing countries, some of the  organizations
mentioned  no  more than once or  twice  are  primarily  investment  promotion
units,  such  as the  Mauritius Export  Development  and  Investment  Authority
(MEDIA). Or else,  like Chile's PROCHILE, they have  tended  to focus  on
primary  exports. In some other cases, the  praise  was strictly  relative
or applied  only  to  a brief  era  in  the  past.
The  Public  Service  Model  in Practice
Not  only  is the  public  service  model  fundamentally  inappropriate,
but  our  research  provides  abundant  evidence  that  the  developing  countries'
experience  with this  model  has  been  almost  uniformly  negative.
Policies  impeding  and  neglecting the  development  of commercial
services  are  a  significant  cause of  the  difficulties  experienced  by
developing  countries  that  are  trying to  expand exports. Reliance  on a
12  The  one  in  Thailand is  the  Department of  Export  Promotion  in the
Ministry  of  Commerce,  which  has  a  staff of 517  and  gets  its  officers
on rotation  from  the  civil service; that in Sri  Lanka  is the  Export
Development  Board,  with  a staff  of 229;  and  the  one in  the  Philippines
is  the  Center  for  International  Trade Exhibitions and  Missions,  a
somewhat  smaller  organization  in  competition  with  other  public  sector
TPOs  in the  Philippines,  with  a strong  program  of  design  assistance  to
firms  to  help them  prepare for  trade shows. All  three  benefit  from
continuing  foreign assistance.  Many  experts consider even  these
organizations  to be  weak  and.their  services  of  dubious  value.-27-
public  sector  TPO  for  services that are  better carried  out  by private
commercial  enterprises  has  contributed  to  this neglect.  Thus,  for  the
reasons  given  here,  we  conclude that entrusting  the  public  service  with
primary  responsibility  for  providing support services to exporters  is
misguided.
Box  1  presents  a  sample of the  typical  negative  characteristics
of the  worst  TPOs as  culled from the  literature  and  from  interviews.
Although  characteristics  are  typical  of the  worst  TPOs,  they  are  extremely
common in  others as  well.  In  our  estimation,  over half  these
characteristics  are  found  in  the  great majority of developing  country
trade  promotion  organizations.
Six  factors,  in  particular,  have  contributed  to  the
ineffectiveness  of the  public service TPO model:  the  unsuitability  of
government employees to  the  task, the  inflexibility  of  government
procedures  in  regard to  expenditures  and  stafting, the  confusion  of
purpose  resulting  from  the  assumption  of  regulatory  and  administrative
roles,  the  perpetuation  of  wrong  attitudes and  strategies,  misguided
evenhandedness,  and  the  neglect  of  the  development  of commercial  services.
Unsuitability  of government  employees.  Public  servants  adapt  badly
to the  tasks  of supplying  services  to commercial  enterprises  and  promoting
business. They  are  generally not  recruited or trained  for  such  tasks.
Their fundamental  attitudes  are  geared toward administration,  not
commercial  success,  and  their interests tend  to lie  in  regulatory  tasks
and  policy  design.
The  problem of  basic attitudes goes even  deeper in  those
developing  countries with  a  strong cultural divide  between  government
officials  and  the  trading community.  This divide  further  reduces  the- 28  -
Box  1.  Characteristics  of  Ineffectivo  Trade  Promotion  Organizations
Orisins
Set  up initially  on  donor  agency  advice  and  with donor  funding,  not  as  a result  of  demand
from  exporters
Plann  In*and Oblectiv-s
*  No  corporate  planning,  individual  targets,  or  measurable  departmental  objectiv-s
*  'PlannIng'  starts  with  the  amount of  funds the  government  will  allocate,  from  which  the
trade  promotion  organization  then  derives  its  program
*  Its role  Is vliwed as  carrying out  the  *national  export strategy,'  policy  advice,
administrative  tasks,  and  so  on rather  than  being  responsible  for  export  expansion
*  No  consistency  in  focus:  this  year  it is  handicrafts,  last  year  it  was  spices
*  Has  never  conducted,  using its own  resources,  competent,  formal,  subsector  studies  of
industries  with  export  potential
Relationship  to  Government
*  Government  has  no  faith  in  trade  promotion  organization,  but  refuses  to  abolish  it
*  Organization  is  seriously  underfunded,  so  little  or  no  fundz are  available  for  direct
assistance  to exporters
Relationship  with  Business  Community
*  Strong  cultural  divide  *xists  between  public  servants  and  the  business  community,  sometimes
based  on  ethnic  or  caste  differences,  sometimes  merely  on lifestyle  and  attitudes
*  Business community  needs coaxing to  take  part  in any trade promotion  organization
activities  and  is  solicited  using  financial  inducements  such  as  free  travel
*  Instead  of immediately  distributing  useful information  widely to  exporters,  the  trade
promotion  organization  retains  it  as  a  bargaining  chip
*  More  services  are  provided  to government  than  to  exporters
Missions  and Trade  Fairs
Missions  and  trade  fairs represent  the  only significant  Impact of  the  trade  promotion
organization  on  the business  community
*  At least  one-third  of  missions consist of  trade promotion  organization  staff  or other
public  servants
C  Other  participants  are  selected  partly on the  basis  of  noncommercial  considerations,  such
as  maintaining  regional  balance,  favoring  indigenous  entrepreneurs,  giving  everyone  a turn,
or by  drawing  lots
e  Missions  spend  at least  one-third  of  their time  overseas  meeting  government  officials  and
other  functionaries
C  Missions  are  mostly  'exploratory,'  and rarely  generate  orders
There  is  no  effective  follow-up  to  assess  impact
Relationship  to  Donor  Agencies
C  Organization  has  been  the  subject  of at least  two  expert  reports  proposing  major  reforms
*  Organization  has  been  effective  at resisting  major  reform  proposals
*  Organization  is  effective  at playing donor agencies off  against each  other  to  obtain
funding  for its  favored  projects,  such as  overseas training  for its  staff,  computers  for
trade  information  systems,  and  trade  miss  jns  and  trade  fairs  to  attractive  destinations
Manaaement
*  Chief  executive  officer  is  appointed  by  d  ministry and  not  by  an independent  board,  and
while  some  managers  may  be  effective,  others  are  political  appointees  and  useless
*  Most  top  managers  have  no  commercial  experience
*  Organization  has no  effective  managerial  control over overseas commercial  posts  (for
example,  those  in  the  diplomatic  service  may be  controlled  by  the  foreign  ministry)
Staff
*  Public  servants  are  paid  so badly  that  many  have  second  jobs
*  Many  spend  80%  of  their  time  at  their  desks and -arely  do 'cold'  calls  on firms  to promote
exporting  or  their  services
*  Organization  is  overloaded  with  unmotivated  clerical staff who  spend  most  of  their  time
reading  papers,  chatting,  or  dozing  at  their  desks
*  Senior  staff  are  actively  looking  for  a  way out,  preferably  a  highly  paid  position  with  a
donor  agency  in  an  attractive  location- 29 -
capacity  of the  public  service to  gain  the  business  community  confidence.
In  many  developing  countries,  the  public  service  is considered  inherently
suspect. The  business  community has  come  to  expect  that  officials  will
exploit  their  regulatory  powers  in  a  negative  way.
The  low  status of  work  on  trade and  industry within  the
government  service  in  many developing  countries  also  makes  attracting  able
staff  to trade  promotion  organizations  difficult. The  quality  of staff  is
further  depressed  in  many countries  by.  pay  freezes  which  lead  to low  and
declining  salaries in  real terms.  Commonly the  TPO  is  staffed  by
officials  from  the  regular government service who  are  rotated  to other
jobs  within  three  or four  years. Thus  they  have  little  incentive  to  build
up specialized  knowledge and  skills relating to  export  expansion,  let
alone  skills  in  providing  business services to exporters.  Whatever  they
do learn  is lost  to the  TPO  when they  leave.
Even  in  developed  nations, entrepreneurs  doubt  the  usefulness  of
public  servants  as sources  of  advisory services.  In three  studies  quoted
by Seringhaus,  three-quarters  of the  respondents  had a  negative  opinion  of
the  government's  ability  to  assist them  in exporting  (Seringhaus  1986  pp.
59-60). In the  other  four  studies he cites,  about  half  of the  respondent
firms  had  a favorable  perception  of government  assistance. 13
Inflexibility  of  government procedures.  In  most  governments  in
developing  countries,  expenditures  by  nearly all  public  sector  agencies
are  subject  to  detailed scrutiny based  on rigid  bureaucratic  procedures.
For  example, detailed travel requests  may  have  to  be  submitted  and
justified  many  months  in  advance, often as  part  of the  annual  budget.
-13 For  a  more  general view  of  this subject see  Seringhaus  and  Rosson
(1990).- 30 -
Payment  for  services  may  only  be  allowed on presentation  of  an invoice
after  completion  of the  service.  Hiring  anyone,  even  tempurarily,  can  be
incredibly  difficult. These types of  procedures  -and rules  may  not  be
limited  to  government  agencies, but  may  apply  within  any  not-for-profit
institution  the  state  funds.  Procedures such as  these often  make
operating  a  responsive service and  promotion organization  within  the
government,  or  even within  the  public sector, impractical.  Rigid
bureaucratic  procedures  can.all  too  easily waste  much of the  staff's  time
and  energy  and  thwart  any  chance  of the  organization  being  effective.
Confusion  of  purpo a.  The  business community's  mist  :ust  of TPOs  is
deepened  in  countries  where  trade  promotion  organizations  are responsible
for  regulatory  tasks. These  tasks commonly involve such  activities  as
handling  compulsory  registration  of  exporters,  providing  documents  needed
to obtain  import  licenses,  and  certifying  exporters  as eligible  for  export
incentives.  Exporters  who are  required  to  deal  with  TPO  as regulators  are
rarely  inclined  to trust them as  a  source  of information  or  marketing-
related  services. Even  the  involvement  of a TPO  in  an administrative  role
helpful  to  exporters has  a  mixed  effect on  the  relationship.  Thus,
Colombia's  PROEXPO  provides  preshipment  export  credit  for  working  capital
and  other  financing  of exports,  while  Sri  Lanka's  Export  Development  Board
administers  a  wide range  of financial  incentive  programs  for  exporters.  By
comparison  with this  assistance the  TPO's  role  in  providing  information
services  is of little  concern  to exporting  firms.
Perpetuation  of the  wrong  attitudes and  strategies.  Most  developing
country  TPOs  have  been reactive and  poorly  informed  in their  approach  to
manufactured  exports. They  have  perpetuated  the  tendency  of local  firms
to  underestimate  the  challenge  of  moving  from  domestic  to  export  markets,- 31 -
not  least  by encouraging  the  misguided  belief  that  export  success  requires
only  a few  good  business  contacts.
In general,  the  TPOs  have  concentrated  on the  final  stage  of the
marketing  process,  namely,  the  active selling  stage,  by emphasizing  trade
fair  participation,  sales  missions,  and  the  like. Thus  they  have  tended
to bypass  the  vital  preparatory  stages of researching  and  exploring  the
market  and  encouraging  firms to  adapt what  they  supply  to the  market's
needs. Indeed,  seeing  themselves as  primarily  answerable  to  a  ministry,
they  have  also  tended  to  concentrate  on  large  visible  group  events  that
get  plenty  of local  press  coverage  for  the  TPO  and  the  trade  minister,  but
may do little  for  export  expansion.
Misguided evenhandedness.  As  international  markets are  mostly
extreme buyers markets, they are  highly discriminatory.  In  each
transaction  the  buyer  is  usually able to  choose a supplier  from  among
hundreds of  very willing candidates.  Over  time, the  market will
inevitably reject large numbers  of  would-be market entrants from
developing  countries.
Public  service  TPOs  are  uncomfortable  with this  characteristic  of
the  market. A  general public service tradition  holds  that  the  service
should  not  be seen  to favor  any  particular  commercial  firm. The  result  is
that  nearly  all  public sector TPOs dislike and  resist the  notion  of
selecting  particular  firms  for  assistance.  Instead, they  maintain  an
attitude  of  evenhandedness  and  nondiscrimination.  At each  step,  the  quest
for  the  appearance of  impartiality  leads most  TPOs  to  a  diluted  and
diffused  effort,  and  so  to  a  more  passive  and  reactive  relationship  with
firms  than  is  compatible  with good  results.
Misguided evenhandedness  is  particularly prevalent in  the
selection  of industries  and  products for  assistance.  It is  especially- 32 -
pernicious  in  its  effect when  only  a  few  industries  are  even  close  to
being  ready  to  export, or  enjoy anything close  to  a suitable  policy
environment.  The  experience  of  the  Trade  Development  Authority  (TDA)  in
India  provides  an example  of  how  nondiscrimination  has  hampered  effective
export  promotion. TDA  was set  up  in  1970  to provide  export  assistance  on
a highly  selective  basis.  Initially it  confined itself to a few  key
products,  with only  ten  clients  per  product,  and  only  assisted  its  clients
in  the  demanding  markets  of  Western  Europe  and  North  America. As a public
service  organization,  however,  it  soon  found  itself  under  heavy  pressure
from  firms  and  industries  it  had  not  selected,  which  were complaining  that
public  money  was  being  spent to  favor a  few  selected  firms. TDA  was
unable  or unwilling to  resist this pressure. As  a  result,  when last
visited  it  had  1,200 members, covered 34  product  groups,  and  extended
assistance  to exports  to  54 countries.
Another  area  in  which  misguided  evenhandedness  can  be especially
harmful is  in  the  provision of  information  to  potential buyers  or
importers  about  potential suppliers.  The  information  that  buyers  most
value  about  suppliers  is how  they have  performed  as exporters,  both  by
absolute  standards  and relative to  other  suppliers-.  Guiding  buyers  to
suitable  and  dependable  suppliers  is  strongly desirable in the  interest
of export  expansion. Among  other  advantages,  it  helps  to avoid  disastrous
failures  early  on,  which  can  ruin the  reputation  of the  entire  country  as
a source  of supply.
The  official TPOs  in  the  newly  industrializing  East Asian
economies  (Korea,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  and  Taiwan,  China)  have found  ways
to give  buyers  this  information. Yet  we know  of no TPus  in  a developing
country  with  policies  that are  less than  fully  satisfactory  for  exports
that  is  willing  to  provide  such  information.- 33 -
Neglect  of the  development  of  commercial services.  Since  TPOs
typically  perform  service  tasks  badly, the  fact  that  they  offer  services
free  of  charge  does-  not  in  itself prevent (although it  may slow)  the
emergence  of a private  market  in  commercial  services.
What  does  seriously  impede this emergence is  the  prevalence  of
developing  country  policies that discourage competition  in services  and
prevent  foreign  entrants  and  foreign  investments.  Where  foreign  firms  are
allowed  to operate  in  services, they are  often  the  information  sources
most sought  out  by exporters  as  well  as  visiting  foreign  buyers. All  too
frequently,  however, policies toward private commercial  service  firms,
especially  foreign  ones,  are  negative.
Probably  even  worse  in  terms of  immediate  effects  on exports,
policies  of developing  countries frequently limit local  firms  access  to
commercial  service  suppliers  based  in more advanced  countries. These  are
potentially  a  crucial  source  of  first-rate  consultant assistance,
marketing  advice,  information,  and  practical services  for  exporters,  but
until  a  country's  currency becomes convertible,  access  to these  services
is  generally impeded by  tortuous procedures for  obtaining foreign
exchange. Travel  visas  may  also  be  inordinately  difficult  to  get.  The
neglect  of commercial services in  each of  these  contexts  is  typically
based  on a distorted  view  of  what  the  public  sector  is  able  to  provide,  as
well  as on a low  regard for  the  economic  importance  of providing  services
compared  to  producing  goods.
The  Beginnings  of  Change:  New  Approaches  in  Outside  Assistance
Some  of the  assistance  providers in  the  export  promotion  field
have  been  influenced  in recent  years  by new  approaches  and  experiments,  as
well  as by severe  criticism  of  previous  approaches.  These  new  approaches- 34 -
include  giving  aid  to  and  through the  private  sector;  helping  exporting
enterprises  directly,  not  least by  providing  supply-related  assistance;
and  offering  matching grants to  exporting firms to  help  them  pay for
services. The  result  has  been  a noticeable  modification  of the  approaches
pursued  in a  majority  of the  organizations  visited,  including  for  example.
the  Center  for  the  Promotion  of Imports  from  Developing  Countries  (CBI)  in
the  Netherlands,  the  Developing  Country  Trade  Agency  (DeCTA)  in the  United
Kingdom,  the  Irish  Export  Board/Cords  Tr&chtAla in Ireland,  and the  U.S.
Agency  for  International  Development.  However, change  has  been  slow  and
the  old  approaches  still  predominate  overall.
Increased  Attention  to Integrated  Projects  and  Supply  Issues
A particularly  dramatic  change  has  taken  place  in  the  assistance
programs of  the  European Community (EC), especially its  Directorate
General  I - External  Relations (DGl),  which  administers  EC assistance  to
developing  countries  in  Asia,  Latin  America,  and  the  Mediterranean  region.
The  EC rivals  ITC  in  the  size of  its  project  expenditures  relating  to
trade  promotion,  but  has  only  a tiny staff  in  this  area. Thus  it relies
heavily  on consultant  firms to  run  its projects.  The  big  change  came
about  primarily  as a result of self-evaluation,  assisted  by an evaluation
study  on the  EC's  trade  promotion  program  undertaken  between  1983  and 1985
by the  Irish  Export  Board  and  a German  consulting  firm,  MPR Braunschweig.
Their  report  was strongly  critical,  as  these  excerpts  from  the  summary  of
findings  demonstrate:
'There  was  no direct  relationship  between  the  trade
promotion  activities  themselves.  They  were treated
as separate items  ...  not  ...  a unified coherent
package  with a  distinct  and  discernible  objective.
As a result  the  programmes  had  limited  effect.- 35 -
'It  could  not  be said  that  the  programme  noticeably
strengthened  the  institutions  or  enhanced  their
role  to a discernible  extent.
"There  was little  or  no follow-up  to the  activities
financed.  Each  activity  was  in  effect an
independent isolated event ....
'There  was little  indication  of long-term  impact  on
the  self-sustaining trade  capability  of  the
countries".
Other  major  points  were equally telling:  there  seemed  to  be no
overall  stret.egy;  nothing  was  being done  to  address  constraints  relating
to  supply capabilities;  actions did  not  come  together to  create  a
coordinated  effort  addressing particular products and  markets,  so that
measures  were actually  in conflict sometimes;  and  too  little  intermediate
and  follow-up  evaluation  was done  in the  course  of implementing  projects.
Reevaluation  of Lihe  existing  programs  led  the  EC to  a decision  in
April  1986  that  helped  transform DGl's approach  and  also  influenced  what
was  done  in  DG8's program for  the  African, Caribbean, and  Pacific
countries. The  new approach  aimed at  the  "development  of trade  in  goods
and  services'  based on  action from the  production stage up to final
distribution.  It emphasized  integrated (and  by implic  ition  realistic  and
coherent) policy,  specific  objectives,  practical  evaluation,  and
coordinated  action,  above all  in  production and  marketing. Among  its
features,  this  new  approach has  been  characterized  in  practice  by an
unwillingness  to  assist  sales  promotion measures  without  prior  efforts  to
address  supply  constraints;  by integrated  major  projects  lasting  three  to
five  years,  usually  dealing  with  specific  product  groups  and  services  and
emphasizing  an  early concentration  on  supply issues; and  by regular
intermediate  evaluation  to  adjust projects to  new  circumstances  and  new
information.- 36 -
Officials  of developing  countries TPOs assisted  in this  new  way
have  responded favorably and  are  taking their own  involvement  more
seriously. The  approach has  also  focused new  attention  on constraints
that  must be overcome  in the  policy  environment  of the  recipient  country.
The  report  and  the  EC's  turn around have  had  less  influence  in
other  assistance  organizations  to which  much  the  same  criticisms  would
apply. Most cannot  turn  their  programs  around  as readily  because  of their
reactive  relationship  to  the  recipient countries, the  role  of budget
entitlements  in  their programs, and  their  responsibility  to  so  many
countries  at once.
ITC,  however,  has  begun a  significant  initiative of its  own,
called  "the  enterprise-oriented  approach."  First  introduced
experimentally  and  now  receiving broader application,  this  approach
directs  consultancy  and marketing assistance to selected  enterprises  in
selected  industries.  The  enterprise-oriented  approach  has  many elements
in  common  with  DG1's  new  integrated  proJects which  start  by  providing
supply-related  assistance. 14 It  also has  much  in  conmon  with  DeCTA's
integrated  project  currently being  implemented  in  India,  which  provides
assistance  starting with  production and  related aspects of supply  to
promising  firms  making  a  few  selected export  products. However,  unlike
DeCTA,  ITC  does not  charge for  any  of  its  assistance  to  enterprises.
14  Expert  consulting  advice  that  gives  systematic  attention  to the  supply
aspects  of  exporting is  by  no  means  a  new  element  in technical
assistance  projects in  this  field.  Some  of  USAID's  assistance
projects  in  the  1960s were  enlightened in  this respect.  As an  j
example,  technical  assistance  to firms  in  the  shoe  industry  in Spain,
provided  for  USAID  by a retired shoe buyer  (Lou  Feeman)  from  a large
U.S. retail  chain,  almost  single-handedly  launched  that  country's  shoe
exports,  whiich  are  now  among  the  world's  largest.- 37 -
(Thus  selection  of firms  and  industries to  be assisted  tends  to  be  more
arbitrary.)  Some  USAID  projects also  provide  supply-oriented  assistance
to firms, for  instance, in Honduras in  support of  a private  export
promotion  organization  (FIDE), as  part of  USAID's worldwide  effort  to
strengthen  and  promote  the  private  sector  in industry  and  exports.
ITC's  enterprise approach grew  largely out  of  experience  in
multicountry  projects in  Asia  that included some advice  on  practical
supply-related  problems,  both  in  individual firms  and  on a  product-group
basis. ITC  launched its  first enterprise-oriented  projects  in 1986  in
China  and  Honduras.  In  China, consultants  have  been  working  with four
firms  in the  furniture  industry  and  three  in  the  silk  garment  industry,  as
well  as the  state trading firms  that market  their  products. Customers
from  Western  markets  place  the  orders and  supply  the  designs,  while  the
consultants  help  teach  the  firms to reorganize  production  and  management
to  meet  the  orders and  to  get  new  orders.  In  Honduras,  the  project
approach  resulted  from  Switzerland's  insistence that  its  trust  funds  not
be  used  there  to  help  the  government  or expand  food  exports.
Today,  more than  100  enterprises  are  receiving  direct  assistance
from  ITC  in  about  20 export-oriented  projects  worldwide. In  each  country,
the  approach  has  proved  Intensive  in  consultant  time,  but  promising  in  its
results. To what  extent other enterprises  not  directly  assisted  will
acquire  the  skills  and  know-how  imparted  is  one  of the  questions  that  will
determine  the  level  of  benefits.
The  World  Bank has  been a  particularly  significant  pioneer  in
introducing  new  methods and  taking aim  squarely at  exporters'  supply
problems. Two  grant  funds  set  up in India  under  a 1986  export  development
project  - the  Productivity  Fund,  managed  by an industrial  development  bank- 38 _
(ICICI),  and  the  Export  Marketing Fund,  managed  by the  Export-Import  Bank
of India  - have  largely completed the  task of giving  out  US$10  million
each  in  matching grants to  firms, in  large part  for  supply-related
consultant services.  Now  under  a  1989 project, four new  export
development  funds  are  being  launched in  India to  provide  similar  grant
assistance.  A new  project component in  the  Philippines  will emphasize
supply-related  assistance to  firms, as  will  the  export support  fund
already  in  operation  in Indonesia.  However,  these  project  components  are
exceptions.  Old  methods have  persisted in  technicai assistance  to
manufactured  exports  in  other  countries.
The  Trend  Toward  Cost  Sharing
In trade  promotion  organizations  in  developed  countries,  perhaps
the  most striking  trend  has  been  toward charging  for  services,  that  is,
cost  sharing  by service  recipients.  This  practice  has  become  widesprepd
in  Western Europe, is  also becoming important in Australia and  New
Zealand,  and  is  now  being  started in  the  United  States. The  change  is
being  introduced  in  part  as a response  to tightening  budget  constraints  as
well as skepticism  about the  appropriateness  of providing  free  official
services  in this  area.  Service charges are  seen  as a  way  of improving
both  the  TPOs'  responsiveness  and  their allocation  of resources,  while
also  serving  to  validate  the  usefulness of  the  services  to  business. In
recent  years  charges  for  services covered 63  percent  of TPO  expenditures
in Switzerland,  40  percent  in  Finland,  33  percent  in  Sweden,  20  percent  in
France,  and  17  percent  in  Norway  (ITC 1988). In  the  United  Kingdom  and
elsewhere,  information  services  are  offered  on a subscription  basis.
In the  case  of  assistance  to developing  countries,  cost  sharing
is  now  an option  in the  EC's  DGI  and  DG8  programs  and  it  is a  key feature- 39 -
of DeCTA's  integrated  project  in  India and  of some  of  CBI's  assistance.
However,  ITC  has  been  slow to  try  cost  sharing,  even  for  enterprise-
oriented  assistance,  and  the  U.N.  system has  no  provision  to  enable
participating  firms  to  contribute  to the  costs  of technical  assistance.  A
proposal  to introduce  service  charges as  a  potential  option  has  been  put
before  ITC's  governing  body.
Concluding  Remarks
This  study  shows  that  in  developing countries  with  no  more than
partly  favorable  policies  toward manufactured  exports,  outside  assistance
to  services  that  promote  and  support manufactured  exports  has  had  little
discernible  impact  on exports  and  has  rarely  been  effective  in  expanding
them.  The  principal  reasons  for  this  lack of  impact  appear  to be  after
effects  of inward-looking  development  policies, neglect  of assistance  to
enterprises  in  the  production  and  supply  aspects of  exporting,
insufficient  donor  concern  about  the  direct  impact  of their  assistance  on
exports,  and  reliance  on an inappropriate  delivery  mechanismr..
We explain our  recommendations  on  how  to  break out  of this
unhappy  state  of affairs  in  our  companion paper. 15 3.  It suggests  new
guidelines  for  donor  assistance,  project components based  on one  or  more
of the  new  methods as  they are  r)w  evolving,  and  new  country  policies
paying  that  emphasize  attention  to  services  for  exports.
15  "Assisting  Manufactured  Exports through Services:  New  Methods  and
Improved  Policies,"  already  cited.- 40 -
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